**Excerpts Matching Tips on Solicitations:**

**Full Solicitation Links:**

[Liberia Accountability and Voice Initiative](https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=122653bea601e1dc9fbadec9dbb2ba8a&tab=core&_cview=1) SOL-669-15-000014

[Cambodia Democratic Development Program](https://www.grants.gov/view-opportunity.html?oppId=291649) RFA-442-17-000003

[Harnessing Emerging Political Leadership for an Accountable Guatemala](https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/search-grants.html?keywords=Enter%20Keyword...RFA-520-17-000002) RFA-520-17-000002

[Senegal Governance for Local Development](https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/search-grants.html?keywords=Senegal%20GOLD) RFA-685-16-000008

[Bosnia Civil Society Sustainability Project](https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/search-grants.html?keywords=Bosnia%20civil%20society) RFA-168-13-000002

[Armenia Advanced Civil Society for Accountable Governance Program](https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/search-grants.html?keywords=armenia%20advanced%20cviil) RFI-111-13-000001

[Vietnam Pathways to Participation](https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/search-grants.html?keywords=Vietnam%20pathways%20participation) RFA-486-11-016

[Bangladesh Feed the Future Rice and Diversified Crops](https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/search-grants.html?keywords=Feed%20the%20Future%20Rice%20and%20Diversified%20Crops%20) RFA-388-16-000001

**Acknowledge History, LAVI:**

Informed influence in reform processes is not merely a function of technical skill. Weak constituency representation and governance structures undermine the ‘political legitimacy’ of CSOs in the eyes of state actors, often justifiably so. Membership organizations are not necessarily more democratic; membership mobilization can be very weak, and leadership hierarchical and not subject to renewal. Capacity development support is mostly provided by International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) and consultants, with inconsistent quality. Similar to other post-conflict environments, the predominance of international implementers has contributed to the weak local market for capacity development service providers by displacing local providers and, to some extent, precluding the development of local expertise. The few local providers that do exist are not well adapted to the sector. USAID’s current Civil Society and Media Leadership (CSML) activity has focused on strengthening six larger CSOs to provide capacity development services, including mentoring. Reliance on funding from donors or INGOs forces Liberian CSOs to compete amongst themselves and hamstrings them politically by tying them to funders’ agendas. Donor financing, largely channeled through international intermediaries, has tended to be project and activity specific, seldom more than 12 months in duration, and core funding is extremely rare. This approach to funding limits their opportunity to develop long-term strategies, broader funding bases, attract and retain human resources, and address issues of sustainability. Diversified funding bases are needed to ensure greater self-direction, but many CSOs will continue to rely on external sources, as is the case globally. There are a wide range of less formalized CSOs and CBOs that rely on volunteers and membership dues. Approximately 85 percent of CSOs surveyed in a recent national mapping exercise do not receive external sponsorship of any kind.

**Frame the Issues in Context, Senegal GOLD:**

Senegal is an anchor of stability in West Africa, and has been on a positive trajectory towards more democratic governance over the last several years. Under the Macky Sall administration, elected in 2012, the Government of Senegal (GOS) has launched the Acte III of decentralization policy reform and committed to more participatory, inclusive processes and greater engagement with civil society. In the lead-up to the 2012 elections, civil society organizations (CSOs) demonstrated capacity to aggregate and articulate citizen voices and needs. Meanwhile, a culture of entrepreneurship strives for the right opportunities to move the private sector forward. Young people—mobilized and energized during the 2012 elections—are seeking employment and leadership opportunities to engage in the development of their country. Women play an increasingly active role at all levels and hold 43% of the seats in the National Assembly, placing Senegal seventh globally for the percentage of women holding national parliamentary seats.

Nevertheless, Senegal is still in the process of developing a culture of civic engagement in governance that extends beyond participation in national and local elections. As such, there are limited opportunities for citizens to express their needs and concerns to their government and elected leaders. The GOS recognizes this need for more participatory governance mechanisms and to foster a culture of “coproduction” whereby the government and citizens work in partnership to plan and implement development priorities. The Ministry of Local Governance, Development and Territorial Administration (hereafter referred to as MoLG) has identified this as a priority area for support from USAID. In the meantime, the Ministry of African Integration, of the NEPAD and of the Promotion of Good Governance (MGG) also has a role in the implementation of the reform, and has been advocating a decree that would provide a framework for consultative processes that should serve to institutionalize and guide citizen

participation. It also has been working on synthesizing tools for local governments to use for citizen oversight, planning, and maintenance of existing infrastructure, for example...

Among the constraints to fund transfers described above, USAID/Senegal has identified as the most critical and binding i) the low level of funds transferred and ii) the delays in receipt of those funds. USAID understands that achieving real, sustainable impact in advancing decentralized governance and seeing its full potential benefits to service delivery demands a concerted effort on these key issues by all key stakeholders such as: central government institutions; the Association of Mayors of Senegal (AMS); civil society; media; the private sector; and the donor community.

In addition, to seeking ways to improve allocations of centrally transferred funds, USAID/Senegal will look to the Implementing Partner to work on alternative, own source funding for CLs. Indeed, the integral “communalization” of CLs through the Acte III offers CLs more opportunities to raise funds and to increase local tax revenues. USAID’s analysis and stakeholder consultations indicate that CLs already try to compliment the funds received from the central government with funds generated locally. This is an opportunity for the Governance for Local Development Activity: by strengthening the collaboration between communities and elected officials with civil servants—particularly treasury agents—in local resource mobilization (including taxation) and revenue generation at the CL level, local governments may better identify and exploit their own internal revenue sources.

The delay in the transfer of funds to CLs is a complex and systemic problem. Solving this issue requires strong political will from the very top all the way through the public sector to prioritize the CLs’ needs and the restructuration of the funds transfer system to make financial resources available for CLs in a very short time.

To influence and promote change in the system, the Activity will support USAID/Senegal’s efforts to conduct strategic policy dialogue, jointly with other interested donors, involving key stakeholders such as the Ministries of Finance, sector Ministries, the Association of Mayors, civic activists, and other development partners. USAID will pursue a joint approach with development partners from the Decentralization Working Group towards having open discussions with the GOS on this issue, and leveraging each other’s activities to assist Senegal in achieving progress on the timing of disbursements. The MOLG is the principal interlocutor for the decentralization activities, but the dialogue will include USAID priority sector line ministries, the President’s Office, the MGG, and others.

The details of budget issues mentioned above entail several political counter-currents. Some of the laws are already in place for a robust decentralized system, but their implementation will be more difficult. Understanding the context as a guide to the Activity approach and complementing national and local initiatives will boost its effectiveness.

**Hypothesize About Power - LAVI:**

The contractor shall facilitate processes that bring actors together, by providing spaces for engagement, grants, information and organizational development and technical support. An understanding of power dynamics and prevailing incentives and interests is a pre-condition to identifying which approaches will influence the behaviors of different actors, and therefore how improved transparency and accountability will occur. The contractor shall place emphasis on supporting partners to use a political economy informed analysis to guide decisions on focal areas, and to tailor interventions and advocacy approaches to suit the circumstances. This will also help frame who the critical actors are, whose voice is excluded, which organizations will be supported, and geographical implementation areas.

Typically, significant change requires sustained action over time so it is anticipated that a relatively limited number of themes will be targeted during the life of the activity. Selection criteria for the themes will be finalized after contract award, but indicative criteria are their potential to:

a) Work ‘with the grain’, or on issues and reforms that already have some traction;

b) Address core social equity concerns;

c) Make tangible improvements for citizens;

d) Develop linkages between different types of development actors; and

e) Strengthen citizen-state accountability relationships.

LAVI emphasizes the promotion of joint action by a range of organizations on a limited number of focused issues. An important measure of success is whether the activity can strengthen linkages between and beyond civil society groups. Linkages may be formal or informal, and can be understood in two dimensions:

a) Vertical linkages – linkages between communities and organizations working at the grassroots, and those that are able to influence the actions of local or national leaders and decision-makers within or outside of the government.

b) Horizontal linkages – organizations and individuals working effectively together, either in formal networks or informal coalitions, at various levels –from the grassroots to the national level.

The approach recognizes that institutional change is driven not just by the activities of government offices, but that it also occurs in response to broader interests in society. Seeking out ways to connect increased voice with the relevant actors in government institutions and strengthening mechanisms that function to bring the state and citizen together are central to this approach. The contractor’s role will be to facilitate the creation of political space for Liberians to debate and decide their own solutions to context-specific questions related to governance and political representation, with an emphasis on identifying the spaces where change is already happening and nurturing those processes. Members of the partnership will lead on the issue and processes, while the contractor will provide supportive guidance from behind. The contractor’s facilitation of networks and partnerships should be appropriate to the problems identified and the theory of change, and should not necessarily seek to create formal or permanent relationships. An important focus across LAVI will be on building the capacity of CSOs to work more effectively with media, to include new media. This work will complement the more intensive media development activity which will be awarded separately and will need to be closely coordinated to avoid duplication and build synergies.

**Hypothesize About Power (2), Bosnia Civil Society Support Project**

There are two primary development hypotheses underlying the proposed strategic and operational approach for the new civil society project. These hypotheses are interrelated, yet unique in their own right. The overarching hypothesis is that civil society sustainability and the effectiveness of CSOs in influencing government accountability is tied to the ability of CSOs to partner with a wide array of stakeholder groups, including membership organizations, the private sector, and others, and to ensure their efforts are considered relevant by these groups and by Bosnian citizens.

*Relevance of Civil Society Efforts to Broader Constituencies*

A key aspect for CSOs working on influencing public policy and engaging in government oversight is to link their work to that of other actors. USAID and other USG entities have invested large amounts of funding into the technical capacity of such CSOs in Bosnia and it is high; the results however are less sustainable because they are not perceived as collective, but rather as individual efforts without visible support by the public. In short: they lack or appear to lack legitimacy, despite proficiency in their analytic work. This not only results in a low public image, but also in government and other stakeholders, including media, perceiving them as powerless. Addressing this weakness, by incentivizing core civil society partners to engage with a wider group of stakeholders, together with other strategic inputs, will help achieve objectives.

*Civil society sustainability and the importance of leadership*

A key aspect of sustainability is for civil society to take on a greater leadership role in broad reform efforts, particularly as donor engagement in that space may start to draw down; a trend which is notable in the Balkan region. If civil society actors do not take collective responsibility for their future, and become used to ways of working in which they depend on and benefit from one another for ideas, results, and links to resources, they will not adapt to a post-OHR/post-donor environment. This entails changes in defined roles (platforms that link actors around issues; taking on leadership roles for the broader sector, etc.) but more importantly this entails changes in ways of working. CSOs must more strongly tie their work to the needs of domestic stakeholders, including businesses, membership organizations, and grassroots groups articulating citizen needs. CSOs also must take responsibility for the orientation of their work, and for gauging and increasing their own relevance to non-donor groups. Finally, they must explicitly identify pathways to financial and organizational viability, charting their value-added to civil society more broadly, their upcoming market as most donors reduce funding, how it is expected to change, and identifying new and diverse potential partners and funding avenues.

In order to support greater sustainability within civil society, USAID must itself engage with partners differently, giving them incentives to take on more of a leadership role, making more of the planned resources driven by both their demand and their ability to channel those of others, and holding partners more accountable for their linkages, role in society, and effectiveness within the political space. Building on existing partnerships and positive precedent in this sector, USAID must also assist its core partners to understand upcoming changes and give them space to exert their own views as how they plan for and cope with those changes. Through the new project, USAID will structure its work and ways of working to deliberately incentivize and reward local leadership. This requires certain risks, as giving immediate direction to work gives way to supporting partners' own choices even where USAID may not be in complete agreement with those choices. As one of a multitude of donors in Bosnia, USAID will need to support its partners in shaping the agenda that multiple donors will convene around.

A second hypothesis guiding this project is that the primary reason citizens in Bosnia do not engage in policy advocacy and government oversight activities or other social change efforts is that they do not believe that they can make a difference (they lack a sense of self-efficacy) and that their efforts will have a significant impact on their daily lives (limited motivation due to perceived lack of relevance). This is compounded by the complexity of the governance system and the fact that most people do not understand how to navigate the system in order to bring change (lack of civic knowledge and skills). Focusing on issues of concern to citizens, strengthening relationships between stakeholders that understand the political system and average citizens (to inform the latter about channels for engagement and assist the former in understanding the issues of concern to the public), and demonstrating the possibility to achieve results, will result in an increase in civic engagement.

**Hypothesize about Power (3), Serbia Competitiveness**

Once USAID has approved the proposed value chain targets, implementation of activities will begin. The Contractor must propose methods of intervention consistent with the following principles:

1. Focus on root causes. The Contractor must place emphasis on those constraints to competitiveness that are both binding and amenable to change. Alleviating these particular constraints will allow for more systemic change to stimulate SME growth.
2. Facilitate change through the local system. Over time it has been observed that the prior firmlevel approach, while effective at creating change within those individual firms, has not been able to stimulate broader change at a systemic level. Therefore the Contractor must use a facilitation approach in its implementation. The Contractor must seek to strengthen the system for SME development in Serbia by facilitating the growth of relationships among SMEs, and between SMEs, support institutions, scientific and research and development institutions, and financial institutions. The quality of these relationships is key to facilitating investments in upgrading and improving investments. Thus the focus of the Contractor’s interventions must be on directly investing in the capacity and network development of these key local actors through a self-selection process with USAID and its partners. By facilitating through local actors, which is consistent with USAID’s Local Systems Framework , the relationships formed and capacities developed will inherently rest within the local system and will be more likely to be sustained over time.
3. Let local partners self-select. The self-selection process of partnership is critical to the success of a facilitation approach. This principle can be utilized at a more macro level through a competitive selection process for sectors, value chains, or areas of focus. At a more micro level, an open collaboration offer can be extended, but the Contractor must work with those that have the most enthusiastic response within the competitiveness system, whether these are anchor firms in a value chain, local economic development offices, Regional Development Agencies, business associations, or clusters. If the original local partners come to find the collaboration is no longer of interest for their investment, the Contractor will be free to let them go and seek interest elsewhere. The desire to invest in the change must come from within the local system.
4. Leverage local resources. This approach also uses USAID resources more strategically, deploying them only when local actors also invest. The Contractor and its implementing partners must seek this effect to leverage additional resources from the private sector, the GoS, or other donors, as appropriate. As the USAID investment declines over the life of the CSS activity, the local actors have a precedent of investment and will be more prepared to continue that investment after the CSS activity ends.

The Contractor is encouraged to suggest innovative ideas and pathways to achieve the CSS activity’s main objective, and to invest project resources in piloting and refining approaches to improve the competitiveness system over the course of project implementation.

**Value the Valuable, Vietnam Pathways to Participation**

The Technical Approach should present a clear description of how the proposed strategies can be reasonably expected to lead to the sustainability of targeted Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Vietnam, legitimize their voice, and establish sustainable, cost-effective systems that enable CSOs to contribute as valued participants in Vietnam’s national HIV/AIDS response...

*Program Framework* The Pathways for Participation Project aims to improve the sustainability of CSOs, legitimize their voice, and establish systems and platforms whereby CSOs can contribute as valued participants in the national HIV/AIDS response. To promote sustainability and effective representation and participation, the Project will support CSOs to develop their organizational and technical capacity and governance systems, showcase promising models and results in order to demonstrate their merit, and secure their “place at the table” in Vietnam’s HIV/AIDS response...In order to secure effective participation and the capacity to influence HIV policies, plans and programming, the Recipient and the LCBLA(s) must work together to create demand from MARPS and PLHIV for effective representation and participation, and to advocate for increased GVN recognition and engagement of civil society expressed through representation in decision-making and coordination forums, advisory mechanisms, and consultation opportunities.

**Value the Valuable (2), Armenia ACSAGP**

Result Area 1: Civil society’s ability to engage citizens and advocate for their interests
improved and sustained.

One of the challenges facing Armenian CSOs is the gap between the CSO and the public and that the interests of citizens are not well articulated. Voice of people/citizens is not included from the beginning of the policy making process, decision making is top down, and the opportunity for
citizen input only occurs after main policy is decided. This situation frequently results in the
public perception that CSOs are more interested in funding than in advancing the public’s
interest. The lack of citizen engagement also contributes the poor outcomes of CSO advocacy
efforts as they are not seen as credible by either government or the public.

Success in this area will require CSOs to engage citizens, have them understand issues, collect
views and ideas, demonstrate positions, etc. and carry out advocacy campaigns in which they
reach out to and mobilize citizens around selected policies, improve their ability to aggregate
citizen’s interests and better articulate their recommendations to decision-makers and other
audiences. As a result broader groups of citizens will be informed, engaged and influence
decision making on important policies that impact people’s lives.

Special attention will be made to ensure that relevant stakeholders are encouraged to participate in local, community level decision making processes, especially those in rural areas and those who would otherwise be marginalized. Advocacy efforts will also be evidence-based, drawing on the results of systematic monitoring and/or independent research. Advocacy campaigns are more likely to be successful when CSOs work together in coalitions, networks or platforms since there is strength, and influence, in numbers.

**Value the Valuable (3), Guatemala Harnessing Emerging Political Leadership**

Objective 3: *Improved civic leadership skills for emerging political leaders in all communities*

The activities under this objective will identify emerging political leaders and provide opportunities for civic and political engagement. In particular, activities must harness the momentum of youth movements that emerged during the 2015 political crisis. These movements saw a coalition of youth from diverse communities come together to demand governmental accountability and advocate for reforms. The Recipient must ensure that youth engaged in these movements understand the range of challenges in Guatemala. The Recipient will initiate a robust dialogue and interaction between emerging political leaders from marginalized and middle-class communities to build links between them. The Recipient must ensure emerging political leaders coordinate and collaborate on critical issues and promote diversity among project participants. In addition, the Recipient will need to engage non-youth organizations and governmental institutions to more effectively partner with the growing cadre of youth leaders. The Recipient should strive to partner with youth and local organizations in the development, implementation and evaluation of these activities as well.

Expected Results

* Increased cross-cultural understanding of youth from marginalized urban and rural communities and middle or professional-class youth
* Increased partnership between youth-led movements or organizations based in Guatemala City and those outside of Guatemala City
* Increased breadth of issues supported through youth-led civic and political advocacy and actions
* Increased partnership between a more inclusive cadre of youth and adult-led/traditional power structures

**Make Guiding Principles Useful, Cambodia Democratic Development Program**

Guiding Principles

The ability of external actors like USAID to influence change requires a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the power and politics behind RGC’s stated commitment to subnational democratic decentralization. Key questions include:

* What are immutable blockages, given Cambodia’s existing [political situation](http://www.effective-states.org/the-political-settlement-and-economic-growth-in-cambodia/)?
* Where within the RGC can decentralization champions and ‘i[slands of effectiveness](http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/771291468323123138/Can-islands-of-effectiveness-thrive-in-difficult-governance-settings-the-political-economy-of-local-level-collaborative-governance;jsessionid=5SudgmzAF5nmcnxJ-prH1dSV)’ be found, how might they be adapted for replication, and how much influence do they wield?
* How do inter-ministerial and inter-governmental power relations and incentives determine which elements of the IP3-II workplan have - or may be able to gain - support from key national government interlocutors?
* How can coalitions for change around these issues be effectively fostered and supported?
* How might the 2017 local elections and 2018 national elections impact the government’s commitment to decentralizing control of services and supporting governance accountability?

Critical to CDDP’s ability to foster genuine reforms at the sub-national level is robust, real-time political economy analysis that unpack these issues and gives insight into incentives, power structures and possible avenues to advance reform. Applicants are encouraged to offer innovative ideas about how to achieve the goals and objectives of CDDP that demonstrate a solid understanding of Cambodia’s politics and how they work within the country’s social and cultural systems. Programming approaches should be guided by the following principles:

* Align programming with existing RGC strategies and workplans, in particular NP-SNDD and IP3-II.
* Monitor which NP-SNDD policy reforms appear to have political traction, and facilitate broad-based coalitions for change that bring together supporters inside and outside of government.
* [Politically smart, locally-led](https://www.odi.org/publications/8800-politically-smart-locally-led). Investing in ongoing political economy analysis and understanding power and political dynamics will be critical to achieving sustainable, locally-owned results.
* Look beyond the usual suspects. CDDP will place a premium on bringing together diverse partners around issues and reforms that have strong locally-driven support.
* Map formal and informal spaces (e.g., ‘invited policy spaces’ - government-donor-CSO technical working groups and steering committees, youth volunteer networks, grassroots support groups, popular social media sites, blogs, informal political salons,, etc - to determine where to strategically invest time and resources.
* Apply innovation processes that place small bets and test viable pathways for achieving CDDP’s programmatic outcomes. Fail early, fail fast! Don’t be afraid to acknowledge failure; rather, recognize its importance to the learning process, build your next iteration and test again!
* Be ready to flex and respond quickly at critical junctures, such as the 2017 local and 2018 national elections. Strategically use quick response funds to seize on windows of opportunity.
* Be creative about how to foster and empower emerging leaders - particularly women and youth.
* Leverage other USAID and DP programs wherever possible.

**Make Guiding Principles Useful (3), Serbia Strengthening Media Systems Activity**

C.5 OPERATING PRINCIPLES

The Contractor must utilize interventions consistent with the following principles:

*1) Facilitate change through the local system*. Over time it has been observed that the prior approach of extending assistance to individual media outlets, while effective at creating change within those individual outlets, has not been able to stimulate broader change at a systemic level. Therefore, the Contractor must use a [facilitation approach](https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/the_facilitation_approach_at_usaid_07.28.2015.pdf) in its implementation. The Contractor must seek to strengthen the system for media development in Serbia by facilitating the growth of relationships among media system stakeholders and between them, support institutions, private sector players that carry weight in the media system (e.g. PR companies, marketing agencies, etc.), academia, research and development institutions, as the quality of these relationships is crucial to lasting change in the media sector, both in terms of the development of a more enabling legal and regulatory and market environment for media and in terms of the piloting and scaling of partnerships and innovation to bolster the financial sustainability of the sector. Moreover, the focus of the Contractor’s interventions must be on directly investing in the capacity and network development of these key local actors through a self-selection process with USAID and these local actors. By facilitating through local actors, which is consistent with USAID’s [Local Systems Framework](https://www.usaid.gov/policy/local-systems-framework), the relationships formed and capacities developed will inherently rest within the local system and will be more likely to be sustained over time.

*2) Let local partners self-select*. The self-selection process of partnership is critical to the success of a facilitation approach. The Contractor must therefore demonstrate a clear plan to ensure that it is working with those local actors and partners that have the most enthusiastic approach and response to issues facing the Serbian media system, whether these are media associations, individual media outlets, regulators or self-regulators, business associations, private sector actors, or others, and the greatest demonstrated commitment to reform. If the original local partners come to find the collaboration is no longer of interest for their investment, the Contractor will be free to let them go and seek interest elsewhere. The desire to invest in the change must come from within the local system. This is likely to be a key approach to ensuring sustainability beyond donor assistance.

*3) Leverage local resources*. This approach also uses USAID resources more strategically, deploying them only when local actors also invest. The Contractor and its local partners must leverage additional resources from the private sector, the GoS, or other donors, as appropriate. As the USAID investment declines over the life of the SMS activity, the local actors have a precedent of investment and will be more prepared to continue that investment after the SMS activity ends. The Contractor is encouraged to suggest innovative ideas and pathways to achieve the SMS activity’s objectives, and to invest project resources in piloting and refining approaches to improve the enabling environment for media system in Serbia over the course of project implementation.

**Define What We Mean By Adaptive Management**

C.3.3 MONITORING AND EVALUATION
LAVI provides only a broad framework for how civil society-state relations are viewed, and how the activity (through its funded partners) may enable change. Funded interventions may work in a number of sectors, could be of different types (capacity support and mobilization, budget tracking, policy advocacy, etc.), at different levels (grassroots, county government, national, etc.), and with different stakeholders (civil servants, politicians, private firms, civil society organization staff, etc.).

The contractor must emphasize investment in monitoring, evaluation, and learning to assist local partners and USAID to capture where results are being achieved, and to understand how and why. In addition to traditional performance-based monitoring and periodic evaluations, the contractor is expected to employ approaches suitable to non-linear change pathways, and focus on understanding the impact on actors with whom partners directly work. Illustrative methodologies include outcome mapping, network analysis, and most significant change. The outcomes and indicators will be better identified as more becomes known about the initiatives being supported, but are likely to cluster around the following:

* The quality of engagement between civil society and the government;
* Improvements in the performance of service delivery (access, resource allocations, etc.); and
* Equitability, transparency and inclusiveness of decision making processes and public sector organizational units.

USAID recognizes that shifts in the local context can have implications for the achievements of results. Significant shifts may trigger adaption of the approach and indicators to better reflect the context. The contractor, in close collaboration with USAID, shall undertake risk analyses not only to measure progress, but to test whether or not the assumptions continue to hold, providing USAID, the Project Advisory Council (AC), and the contractor with information to make key management decisions regarding the project. The responsibility for monitoring critical assumptions and risks and responding to changes will be shared by the contractor, the AC, and USAID. The contractor shall refine, monitor, and report on risks as part of the Annual Progress Report.

**Show Don’t Tell, Liberia Accountability and Voice Initiative**

*Expected Program Results under Objective 1:*

* Critical mass of actors achieved to stimulate collective action on identified themes
* Networks established or nurtured among a variety of actors to support thematic window design, monitoring and implementation
* Tangible outcomes within specific reform areas

**Instruct Sections on How They’ll Work, Zimbabwe Citizen Engagement Program**

The Offeror’s Learning and Collaboration Approach should describe the Offeror’s approach to developing a locally-owned and relevant learning agenda, including taking direction from CBOs as well as CSOs and other stakeholders. It should describe how learning activities will be interwoven with and support all three Objectives. It should discuss the approach to fostering collaboration across implementation of the three Objectives. It should also articulate how the Offer will use data to inform strategic decisions as appropriate for the context and dynamics.

**Embed Context in How, Liberia Accountability and Voice Initiative**

Offerors must present their technical approach and demonstrate their capabilities and expertise with respect to achieving each of the objectives. The Technical Approach section must demonstrate how the offeror proposes to fulfill the requirements of the contract and the approach that will best achieve these results in a clear, logical, technically sound, and feasible way, reflecting good practices and lessons learned. Technical Proposals must be specific, complete and concise. The Technical Approach should:

* Demonstrate the offeror’s understanding of key issues, challenges, and opportunities in the Liberian governance context that will affect the contract and how they will be overcome and/or leveraged to achieve all contract objectives and deliverables.
* Reflect state-of-the-art technical knowledge relevant to achieving objectives under each of the contract objectives, and achieving sustainable and measurable positive impacts using appropriate monitoring and evaluation approaches.
* Include a draft Monitoring and Evaluation Plan that describes the proposed methodological approach to monitoring, evaluation, and learning. This should include a) description of how the partner will ensure that there is knowledge management and learning applied, especially for local partners; b) a results framework with proposed key outcome, output and performance indicators, as appropriate at this stage, to capture the intended outcomes and results to be achieved and c) proposed risk assessment and monitoring methodology.
* Draw on knowledge and practices from different sectors and disciplines as appropriate – such as civil society strengthening and civic engagement, policy reform processes, public sector reform, and other relevant sector specific disciplines to achieve intended results.
* Substantially contribute to strengthening Liberian institutions and expertise
* Build on prior and ongoing investments of USAID, other donors, non-state actors, and the GOL in each of the contract objectives
* Create and strengthen collaborative approaches, networks, and partnerships among institutions and relevant actors.
* Reflect integration and synergy in the implementation approach across different objectives.

The offeror should include a learning agenda as part of the technical proposal, outlining the most critical knowledge gaps which can be addressed through Contractor interventions.

**Require Context Knowledge, Cambodia CDDP**

The proposed Key Personnel candidates must have technical leadership skills and a minimum of ten years of experience in the promotion of good governance. A minimum of five years of this governance development experience must be in leadership positions with field programs that promote decentralization and deconcentration. They must also have experience managing large programs, a track record building collaborative relationships in complex development environments, and excellent communication skills. At least one other proposed key personnel must have technical expertise in research and training. The candidates should preferably have relevant field experience in Cambodia or in Asia.

**Seek Staffing Patterns Not Staff, Senegal GOLD**

USAID expects relevant staff to have the appropriate qualifications and experience to work as a team to manage a complex U.S. Government Program, especially the ability to bring in regional and international best practices in local governance and to work effectively at every level of governance necessary. The applicant should demonstrate how it will ensure effectiveness and efficiency, in order to achieve maximum benefits and results, and how it will utilize Senegalese professionals for country staff.

**Talk About Learning, Senegal GOLD**

Applicants should propose a limited number (e.g. one to three) of learning objectives that are limited in scope and specifically designed to address important gaps in existing knowledge. The Governance for Local Development Activity Recipient will be expected to collaborate in monitoring efforts with other USAID implementing partners, the MOLG, and other partner programs, to assure that monitoring and evaluation systems are as cost-effective as possible and do not duplicate efforts. For example, some sector-specific results may already be collected by a specialized implementer; or the government may develop monitoring tools or studies that can benefit the Implementing Partner’s learning objectives.

Applicants are encouraged to propose Collaboration, Learning, and Adapting approach (es) they believe will most accurately reflect the Governance for Local Development Activity programmatic results. This may include, for instance, the use of complexity awareness monitoring approaches, operational research, and/or data collection and production through the participation of the beneficiaries to capture the Governance for Local Development Activity outcomes and gauge their sustainability. Applicant approaches that allow for midcourse adjustment and recurrent assessment of approaches are encouraged…

*Promote learning.* While many different efforts are underway in Senegal and elsewhere, the elements that add up to accountable government performance are still not well understood. Work to document not only WHAT has been successful (or not) in promoting effective and accountable local governance, but WHY and HOW.

**Talk About Learning (2), Guatemala Harnessing Emerging Political Leadership**

i. Learning Agenda

The applicant must propose a full learning agenda. The applicant must develop research questions designed to test the theory of change. USAID expects youth to partner in designing the research and learning agenda, collecting and analyzing data, formulating conclusions, and disseminating results as part of a collaborative learning model. Gender-related questions will be integrated into the learning agenda.

The Recipient will work with USAID and key stakeholders to refine and finalize a Learning Agenda, as well a plan for implementing and managing ongoing learning efforts within the scope of the project. This plan will be developed in conjunction with key stakeholders in order to leverage ongoing monitoring, management, and reporting efforts, while distinctly pursuing key learning opportunities the project provides for country-led youth development.

**Ask About Context Monitoring and Decisions, Cambodia CDDP**

*VII. Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning*

CDDP is designed to enable iterative, adaptive approaches to achieving programmatic objectives, guided by network analysis and stakeholder mapping during the initial inception period, and informed by ongoing political economy analysis. Bidders should outline their proposed approach to monitoring, evaluating and learning (MEL), and how they will capture how results are being achieved. In addition to traditional performance-based monitoring and evaluation tools, CDDP is expected to employ approaches suitable to non-linear change pathways. Illustrative methodologies include outcome mapping, network analysis, and most significant change. Special focus should be placed on empowering Cambodian partners - both within and outside of government - to utilize diverse MEL approaches, and to integrate learning into feedback processes that are cyclical and well facilitated.

**Do Away With Suggested/Illustrative Indicators, Zimbabwe Citizen Engagement Program**

*Holistic Research, Learning and Collaboration Agenda*

The Contractor will provide analytic support to better assess the developments, needs, challenges and opportunities of Zimbabwe’s civil society sector writ large, as well as the context in which they operate. This will include an understanding of the dynamic relationships between CBOs, CSOs, and political movements and campaigns, as well as the political economy in which decision-makers operate. Analyses should always take into account the distinct way in which women and young people are impacted or even marginalized as a result of such dynamics.

Offeror should propose a holistic research, learning and collaboration agenda and activities throughout the life of the contract to meet informational and learning needs identified by civic actors at all levels, particularly CSOs. Approach should detail how learning questions will be developed in conjunction with USAID and propose methods to be used in developing and implementing the agenda.

Importantly, the learning to be done under this program will require the buy-in of local stakeholders, particularly the partner CSOs and CBOs, if it is to be influential for how the program partners collectively adapt their behaviors and approaches. The approach should therefore identify how local organizations will be involved in shaping the learning agenda and how the program will ensure that they value and respond to the analytic products and findings.

The program should plan for the majority of efforts related to the learning agenda to be directed by partners towards emerging topics of interest through the period of implementation.

Additionally, the Contractor will initiate and lead strategy review sessions which should be held annually. The purpose of these sessions is to provide a collective platform for updating the problem analysis and determining how best to adapt to evolving local dynamics and new knowledge gained from real-time monitoring and evaluation. These platforms will be essential in helping the Contractor to advance Program Objectives.

The Contractor, in close collaboration with USAID, will identify and enlist individuals who will constitute a reference group. The terms of reference of the group will include being the sounding board for activities that might be carried in the future, grounding of ideas and strategies, reflecting on the changing programming contexts and the likely impact of Program activities. The group should have varying expertise including but not limited to academics, practitioners, economists, women and youth leaders. USAID will convene reference group meetings at least bi-annually and additionally as the need arises. Representatives of the reference group will also participate in the strategy review sessions.

**Managing Stakeholders Counts Too, LAVI**

*C.3.4 MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES*

*Support Project Advisory Council Functioning*

In order to encourage local ownership and high-level strategic direction of the program, the contractor shall support the formation and proper functioning of a Project Advisory Council. Indicative composition includes three eminent Liberians, including at least one drawn from grass roots constituencies, who are respected and grounded in social equity and governance issues, the USAID CLA Advisor, and a civil society specialist from the donor community. Liberian members will serve in their individual capacities except for those representing USAID or another donor. Initial members of the AC will be selected by USAID. Subsequent nominations, where vacancies arise, will be made by the existing members of the AC. The membership will elect a Chair with one-year tenure. The LAVI Chief of Party, and grant partners as appropriate, will brief the AC on issues and progress. Final decision-making will remain with USAID. In conjunction with the Advisory Council and USAID, the Contractor will hold two strategic review sessions each year, one following the submission of the annual progress report and one following submission of the annual work plan. The purpose of these sessions is to provide a collective platform for updating the problem analysis and determining how best to adapt to evolving local dynamics and new knowledge gained from real-time monitoring and evaluation.

**Planning to Adapt, Cambodia CDDP**

*Inception Phase*

Achieving CDDP outcomes will be a process of problem-driven, iterative adaptation. The first six months of the program will serve as an ‘inception phase,’ allowing time for the selected implementer to update and expand on existing political economy analyses of the sub-national democratic development landscape, conduct mapping and network analysis, and identify strategic entry points for engagement and begin testing its initial approaches in agile micro pilots that build in explicit processes of iterative design and adaptation. Based on this, the implementer will draft a second six month work plan with programmatic targets, results metrics, and key assumptions. CDDP’s programmatic priorities will be jointly agreed in consultation with the USAID/AOR. Within the bounds of this agreed-upon framework, the CDDP implementer will be expected to develop a keen understanding of the prospects for particular reforms and identify unanticipated targets of opportunity.

Ongoing, ‘every day’ political economy analysis will be embedded in CDDP’s management. This will allow Program staff and USAID to closely monitor the political and institutional environment, assess the prospects for key NP-SNDD reforms, and quickly shift resources out of areas where progress is unlikely to areas where political will emerges – or new challenges arise. CDDP should be proactive in recommending programming adjustments to USAID, and to be candid about approaches and activities that are not working. Recommended changes should be based upon mutually agreed criteria between the AOR and CDDP implementer during the Program Inception Phase.

**Weave Through Rather Than Pull Out, Senegal GOLD**

*Technical Evaluation Criteria:*

*1) Technical Approach (50%)* The application reflects excellent understanding of the overall program description, including the objectives, activities and tools involved, and it demonstrates an ability to apply evidence-based practices and techniques to reach clearly defined and obtainable results. Specifically, the application’s technical approach must be sound and will be evaluated according to its responsiveness, clarity, comprehensiveness, and feasibility vis-à-vis the NOFO’s requirements (including among other things strategy for cross-sector integration, logical linkages, sustainability, adaptability, gender sensitivity, collaborating, learning and adapting, and coordination). If the application includes cost sharing as a financial stake in the success of the program and/or as a means to ensure greater sustainability of the activity, the Technical Evaluation Committee will take it in consideration to break ties between applications that have equivalent scores against all other factors.

*2) Management Capacity (35%):* The application’s management capacity will be evaluated on its management plan’s demonstrated ability, contextual appropriateness, realism, and efficiency in response to this NOFO, and in terms of carrying out the proposed activities to meet the Governance for Local Development Activity’s objectives (including, as stated in the NOFO, structure, partnerships, division of labor, lines of communication, operational capacity, and aptitudes).

*3) Key Personnel (15%):* Key personnel proposed must have the demonstrated ability, experience, professional competence, academic background, interpersonal skills, management capacity, political astuteness, as well as demonstrated knowledge to successfully and effectively implement the proposed activity as outlined in the requirements for key personnel in Section D.